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Abstract
The United State’s effort to win the war on terrorism by spreading democracy served to legitimize torture by
circumventing international and domestic laws, creating ambiguity and confusion among members of the United
States military. France too, in the French-Algerian War of 1954-1962 used torture in the name of spreading the
benefits of French civilization. This study discusses the role of ideology by comparing similarities between France
and the United States in terms of each nation’s world views. Ideology is discussed in the creation of laws
legitimizing torture and how government officials came to decisions that allowed for abuses to happen. Winning
these wars was considered so important that both the French and U.S. governments either created or interpreted
laws in a way that allowed for torture. Government investigations are examined, revealing the role of ideology in
the reports and how that effected recommendations for punishment for those culpable in torture acts. French bias is
revealed, showing a strong desire to promote the torture activities, believing the methods to be effective. U.S.
reports reveal a desire to fix the problem but do not investigate the roots of the abuse, for fear of losing the moral
ideological authority of carrying out its wars. Ideology affected the judgment of individual soldiers in both
conflicts. Confusion among the soldiers and their sense of duty to their nation affected the decision to engage in
torture, sometimes believing it to be government policy to abuse prisoners in order to stop future attacks. Lastly,
public perception of torture has affected how these wars are remembered. Thus, the experience of France in the
Algerian War of 1954-1962 and its use of torture should have been a warning to the United States of how a wellmeaning ideology can deny people the values those ideologies are said to promote.

Introduction
When pictures of torture at Abu Ghraib became revealed to the public in 2004, the United States faced a
crisis of conscience. How could the United States, a nation which prided itself on being a beacon of liberty be
responsible for such blatant human rights violations? Was it simply the irresponsibility of a few undisciplined
soldiers or symptomatic of a much larger problem, reaching up the chain of command to the highest levels in
government? What were the signs that the use of torture might create the large moral and very public dilemma the
US has been faced with? One answer to these questions may be found in the comparative history of France during
its own crisis concerning torture of Algerians during the French-Algerian War from 1954-1962. France was faced
with an insurgent terrorist group that fought against them and horrified the French loyalists in Algeria. They named
themselves the Front de Libération Nationale. 1 Similar ideologies that promote the spread of a certain way of life
have been parts of the foreign policy of both France and the United States. This desire to spread Western
democratic institutions by way of force often hit snags on the path because of its inherent hypocrisy. The use of
torture became the result of an ideology in the name of good intentions. That tradition of going out into the world
with the intention of spreading cultural values in the name of democracy and liberty had proven very difficult for the
French in Algeria. When leaders of the United States chose to conduct the “War on Terror” in an expansive manner
meant to promote peace and democracy, methods became employed contrary to the values of the mission, which in
turn counteracted the intended outcome. Torture became one of the results of such a single-minded ideology. One
specific precedent that should have been paid attention to more closely by the U.S. government, military, and public
domain was the experience of the nation of France and its use of torture during the French-Algerian War from 19541962.
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The ideological missions of both France and the United States have some very striking similarities. This
may explain why both nations have justified certain actions in the name of their ideologies. In this case, the
accepted use of torture extends from the spreading of certain Western values in a way that undermines those values.
France made the mistake of fighting against a population in the name of Algérie française. 2 The United States is
fighting what it calls the “Global War on Terror” in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere with initial stated proposes of
creating a “transition from dictatorship to democracy” in those nations assumed to sponsor terrorism. 3 However,
attempting to establish democracies by use of military force has its own contradictions.
The “War on Terror” has been fought in an expansive manner with undefined borders. It is not a country
being fought, but a practice of doing things, much like the “War on Drugs” or “War on Poverty.” Therefore, for the
purposes of this research, the main focus of abuse and torture in the “War on Terror” is the Abu Ghraib prison
facility in Iraq, the memorandums which gave rise to abuse, and the subsequent investigations afterward. Also, the
similarities to be found when compared to the French in Algeria are much more striking in the detention facilities
and the insurgency in Iraq. Places like Guantanamo Bay are far from the battlefield and those conducting
interrogations are also far from the battlefield –physically and mentally. That is a basis for future research. The
“War on Terror” is a wholly different type of war with different standards for the handling of detainees in an era of
greater scrutiny for nations conducting counterinsurgency warfare. It is those common soldiers who faced the day to
day operations with insurgents, who may have just returned from a dangerous convoy, who have the most in
common with French soldiers and policemen in Algeria.
One of the best histories of the French-Algerian War is Alistair Horne’s A Savage War of Peace: Algeria
1954-1962. 4 This book served as the basis for a good background of the conflict in general. Additionally, it
unintentionally pointed out many of the similarities between France’s effort to keep Algeria and the United State’s
determination in the war on terror. Many of the parallels are pointed out by Thomas E. Ricks, who said the author
“wrote passages about the French in Algeria that could describe the U.S. military in Iraq,” even though the book was
written years before in 1977. Ricks carefully points out that there are “huge differences between the two wars,”
which is important to clarify. “The United States isn’t a colonial power in Iraq, seeking to maintain a presence of
troops and settlers as long as possible. Rather, in Iraq, victory would consist of getting U.S. personnel out while
leaving behind a relatively friendly, open, stable and independent government.” 5 But the similarities drawn from a
reading of A Savage War of Peace are nonetheless striking. Additionally, President Bush was reading this same
book in 2007 to better understand the conflict in Iraq. 6 He even had the author over at the White House for advice,
based on his expertise. 7
Similarities in how torture came to be practiced by both France and the United States have been discussed
in very recent historiography. Neil MacMaster, in “Torture: From Algiers to Abu Ghraib” discussed the overall
similarities on the paths toward torture and the consequences each nation faced. 8 The overall approach he took is a
good step in promoting further research into these similarities. However, a more specific look at the ideological
aspect of the use of torture can help people to understand how a rational justification can become part of the reason
individuals and groups resort to torture. Sociologist Marnia Lazreg, in Torture and the Twilight of Empire,
describes how torture by the French “was part and parcel of an ideology of subjugation that went beyond Algeria’s
borders.” 9 Torture was front in center much of the focus of that ‘subjugation.’ In the last chapter, she ties it in with
the events of the War on Terror. Lazreg states that “wars of occupation share one thing: They seek to disguise
material and strategic interests as either a ‘civilizing’ or a democracy-disseminating mission.” 10 While the role of
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the ‘civilizing’ mission does help to ‘disguise material and strategic interests,’ she fails to note that there may be a
genuine interest in lifting up those who the French and the United States have both occupied. It is not as simple as
the black and white approach that Lazreg proffers. Instead, given the nature of democracies and the availability of
dissenting opinions and ideas, there have been both those that want the material gains of subjugating others through
violent means and those that want to help others achieve a better quality of life. The role of the Mission
civilisatrice 11 played heavily as the main ideology behind justification for torture by the French in Algeria as
discussed by Rita Maran in Torture: The Role of Ideology in the French-Algerian War. 12 According to her,
ideology was front and center in the reasoning behind the use of torture, and it determined people’s justification for
and against torture. This book, while focusing on French ideology serves as the basis and inspiration for beginning
this comparison of French and U.S. ideologies in regards to torture. This material draws from these sources, but also
from first-hand research of the primary source material.
This study explores five themes in a comparative manner: The ideological missions of the French and the
United States as enlightened, civilized nations that others can and should benefit from; the role of ideology in the
creation of laws that foster torture; ideology in government investigations of abuse; the ideology of the soldiers; and
ideology and public remembrance. The search for similar ideologies in their mission to spread their values to the
world is what drove both France and the United States toward policies which encouraged the use of torture.

Ideological Missions of France and the United States
The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was approved by the National Assembly of France
on August 26, 1789. The French liberal tradition stems from the basic ideals spelled out in that document, which
France has since based its constitutions on. 13 Many of the most important passages declare an element of freedom
from oppression: “Men are born and remain free and equal in their rights;” 14 “The goal of all political associations is
the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and
resistance to oppression;” 15 And most specifically relevant to the use of torture: “Inasmuch as every man is
presumed innocent until he is judged guilty, if it is deemed indispensable to keep him under arrest, all measures not
necessary for securing his person should be severely limited by law.” 16 This document became the cornerstone of
the stated ideals of the French Civilizing Mission during the colonial period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
However, the Rights of Man served as a justification for an idea of French civilization as superior over others.
Therefore, the Rights of Man were “overridden, as were more recent domestic and international legal obligations on
human rights, when the use of torture was routinized by the French state during the war with Algeria” 17 and
elsewhere. Because of the importance considered inherent in the French ideology of extending the Rights of Man to
other peoples of the world, any other considerations to whomever the French colonized took a back seat from their
perspective. The colonized, specifically the Algerians gained the benefits of French civilization whether they liked it
or not. The French used Algeria as the original testing ground for the spread of French Republicanism after
colonization in 1830 during the last days of the reign of Charles X. 18 The French, for their part saw the Mission
civilisatrice as the noblest mission they could perform. They believed they played the part of parent over their
colonies, in effect relegating the colonized to a subservient position in the French Empire. In effect, the French
violated the Rights of Man in order to spread the Rights of Man. “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights,”
the document says, but this was contradictory in everyday life for Algerians throughout the colonial period. The
French experience “documents the far-reaching consequences of a state’s capacity to believe in its own ideology of
freedom and promotion of the individual while using measures, including torture, that deny both.” 19 This is
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something that the United States in its promotion of democracy since the beginning of the War on Terror did not
seem to foresee.
The United States has increasingly seen its mission as one of spreading an idea around the world. The
Declaration of Independence states:
all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the
Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government… 20
Those ideas of Life, Liberty, and Happiness are extensions of the Enlightenment, inspired by men such as John
Locke, and later by Thomas Paine, that famous author of “Common Sense,” so influential during and after the
American Revolution. 21 They were later interpreted as the mission call of the United States to help to secure those
rights to others around the world. That concept, referred to as American Exceptionalism, is the idea that the United
States not only could influence world events, but should do so in order to bring about positive results. Besides, as
arbiters of the flicker of democracy, many Americans saw their country “in a pivotal position in human history” to
spread those ideas. 22 William McKinley, President during the Spanish-American War with Spain, and the one who
decided to keep such places as Puerto Rico and the Philippines as colonies had this to say about America’s mission:
“The American People, intrenched [sic] in freedom at home, take their love for it with them wherever they go… our
sense of justice will not abate under tropic suns in distant seas… so hereafter will the nation demonstrate its fitness
to administer any new estate… and in the fear of God will ‘take occasion by the hand and make the bounds of
freedom wider yet.’” 23 President McKinley saw it as his special duty to keep the Philippines because it was the
mission of the US to provide for them “order and of security for life, property, liberty, freedom of conscience, and
the pursuit of happiness.” 24 Indeed, after the events of World War II, the United States was instrumental in ensuring
the development of democracy for many countries in Western Europe and Asia. Through the Marshall Plan,
economic aid helped stimulate revived democracies propped up by US forces. The Japanese economic boom “took
place against the background of a democratization reform program promoted by the American Occupation
Forces.” 25 Even Taiwan and South Korea eventually emerged as powerful democracies after a time under
dictatorships. 26 More recently, in light of the War on Terror, the mission to spread democracy entered another phase
of importance. During the buildup to the Iraq War, President Bush said in his State of the Union address in January
2003 that:
The American Flag stands for more than our power and our interests. Our Founders dedicated this
country to the cause of human dignity, the rights of every person, and the possibilities of every
life. This conviction leads us into the world to help the afflicted and defend the peace and
confound the designs of evil men. 27
Furthermore, the “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” released in 2002, demonstrated a
sharp change in focus. The US would not just “extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every
continent,” but would do so by “fighting terrorists and tyrants” wherever they may be. 28
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The idea of spreading democracy around the globe is a noble one, but very difficult. Often, promotion of
the spread of democracy has been the justification for military intervention by the United States on several
occasions. 29 However, “the aim of spreading democracy around the globe, moreover, can too easily become a
license for indiscriminate and unending U.S. military interventions in the internal affairs of others.” 30 This use of
‘indiscriminate and unending intervention’ has led to a belief in the superiority of the U.S. mission.
This belief in the superiority of the mission originally had to do with the constant intertwining of liberty
and territorial expansion in the first half of the history of the United States. Territorial expansion was the physical
manifestation of the “national greatness” of the United States those men like Thomas Jefferson promoted. 31 This
idea, “Manifest Destiny,” eventually came to mean using a strong hand in foreign policy as well. During the
Spanish-American War, President McKinley “claimed for the United States a right and duty to establish colonies,
help ‘oppressed peoples,’ and generally project its power and influence into the world. Americans would benefit,
and so would all humanity.” 32 However, methods used by the imperialist US such as the forced subjugation of the
Philippines under the auspices of a guiding parent contradicted the ideals of the mission.
The sense of fraternity that France and the United States both share is the dedication to certain ideological
values and beliefs. This is illustrated in a communication between the two countries in 1959, while France was
struggling in Algeria. In a very frank, emotional letter from French Prime Minister Debré to the U.S. ambassador in
France, he appealed to the ideology of both France and the United States in defense of the mission in Algeria:
You know well moreover that our ideals correspond to yours –did they not originally inspire
them? –and that my government, like General De Gaulle, has the will to practice a policy of
liberalism and of evolution, which alone is capable of reconciling harmoniously in Algeria the
requirements of the two communities. 33
Thus, by touching on similar “ideals,” the P.M. and French government tried to garner support for the civilizing
mission they were engaged in.
The problem with ideology is that “ideologies blinker and blind, obscuring reality and justifying in the
name of high causes extreme inhumanity and wanton destruction.” 34 Thus, in terms of justification for torture, the
‘high cause’ of spreading French and American values overrode concerns for humanity of individuals and their basic
rights under international and domestic law.

Ideology: Interpretation and Creation of Laws that Foster Torture
The French-Algerian War bound France to certain international laws. The most important documents
concerning law at the time were the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UNHR), and the Geneva Conventions. The UNHR specifically states in Article 5 that “No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 35 Also, Article 17 of the Geneva Conventions,
ratified in 1949 state that: “No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on
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prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever.” 36 However, the rules did not define
torture, allowing differing interpretations. It was not until years later under the “Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment” that
torture obtained a useable definition: 37
For the purpose of this Declaration, torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on
a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or confession,
punishing him for an act he has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
him or other persons. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to, lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners. 38
Part of the reason for the useable definition was because of the systematized torture during the French-Algerian
War. However, a more concise explanation can do little when the importance of the ideological mission is seen to
trump all other concerns, even when doing so betrays that mission.
By the time of the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, there was a useable definition as to what
constituted torture. However, outrage after the attacks among the government, and the public sphere at large
contributed much to opening the door to the abuses which were to eventually take the form of the Abu Ghraib prison
scandal.
Part of the liberal French and U.S. tradition of assuming innocence is something that needs to be taken into
consideration. The right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is a staple of democratic tradition. During both
the French-Algerian War and the War on Terrorism, these basic laws were skirted numerous times. Also, since
many terrorists perform their actions outside the laws of warfare, there is thus a viable argument that the laws of
warfare do not apply to them when detained: i.e. laws against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment. In fact, “many terrorist groups demand to be treated as prisoners of war, but they deny
the state the right to take them to court as war criminals for the indiscriminate killing of civilians,” according to
Walter Laqueur. 39 The idea that terrorists act outside the realm of warfare has caused both the creation of new laws,
interpretation of old laws, or the simple disregard for the law in dealing with those deemed to be terrorists.
In clearing the way for abuses to eventually take place, the French government gave “legal sanction” to the
police and military in Algeria which “legitimated the practice of human rights abuse” by declaring a “state of
emergency.” This law, Act No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955: “establishing a state of emergency and declaring the
application in Algeria,” 40 “facilitated house arrests and the internment of tens of thousands of nationalists.” 41 This
broad sweeping power allowed for the justification of torture because once again, it emphasized the importance of
the overall mission of the French to win the war. This law “gave moral and legal sanction to abusers; they would
subsequently view their acts as justified by the ‘fight against terrorism.’” 42 In performing acts of torture, many of
the men who did so “believed themselves to be meeting the requirements of the government’s policy.” 43 When
given the belief that it was acceptable to commit acts of torture because of the right of law, then it became no longer
the responsibility of the individual to decide what was right or wrong.
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Some of the notable passages from the ‘Special Powers’ act include Article 6 which allowed for the “house
arrest in a district or locality of any person… whose activity proves to be too dangerous for public safety and order,”
and for the “creation of camps,” where prisoners would be placed for indefinite amounts of time. 44 These measures
made it easy for the security forces in Algeria to do their job, but at the same time, lessened the measures necessary
to ensure abuses would not happen. The authorities decided what constituted ‘dangerous’ activities, giving them
power to arrest whomever they wanted, while the ‘camps’ were veritable concentration camps where Algerians
starved and their anti-French passions conflagrated. 45
Another passage from the ‘Special Powers’ act, Article 11 gave the authorities the power “to ensure control
of the press and publications of all kinds,” adding a high degree of censorship to the maintaining of order and the
secretiveness of the degree of torture. 46 However, the power of the government under this law to control the press
lacked the effectiveness the pro-Algérie française camp preferred. Intellectuals such as Henri Alleg were able to
publish evidence of torture by the French military and police in Algeria. His book, La Question (The Question) was
his “personal testimony of suffering torture at the hands of the French military.” 47 A near-bestseller, he had been
held for three years without trial and then smuggled out with him his account that he had written while in
detention. 48 He described being electrocuted numerous times, held underwater until he passed out, being kicked,
punched, and punctured at the hands of French intelligence officers. At the end of his book, Alleg talked about how
the people of France had to be told about the truth:
All this, I have had to say for those Frenchmen who will read me. I want them to know that the
Algerians do not confuse their torturers with the great people of France, from whom they have
learnt so much and whose friendship is so dear to them… But they must know what is done IN
THEIR NAME. 49
Alleg’s book reminded people of the Nazi treatment of members of the Resistance in World War II. Drawing on
that parallel, people were extremely upset that their own country, with its legacy of resistance against injustice could
be capable of such brutality. 50 On March 27th, 1958, the French government banned the book and seized copies
from the publishing house as well as newspapers that had published excerpts from it. By then it was too late
because it had “already become a near bestseller and the subject of lively public debate.” 51 Thus, practices such as
establishing into law measures that were purported to spread the ideology of the ‘Rights of Man’ in actuality
contradicted those values. This was seen in publications such as La Question, both in its description of torture
endured and by the government’s reaction to the book itself.
The court system itself in Algeria, while theoretically based on the French system, was in the hands of the
police instead of the Ministry of Justice. This created a system without the separation of powers inherent in
different branches of government. If abuses were to occur by the police, they were to be reinforced by the police
who controlled the justice system:
In other words Muslims were arrested and often tortured by the police, brought before courts
which were both biased and permeated with a spirit of radicalism, and finally, after being
sentenced, passed into the hands of a prison service which itself was subordinate to the police.
The whole process took place within a closed circuit of which torture formed an integral part. 52
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Thus, France fostered a self sustaining system in the courts of Algeria, later helped by the Special Powers act that
gave rise to an environment where authorities tolerated and encouraged torture. Ideology told those in Algeria that
the preservation of the Mission civilisatrice received all-importance, especially when “the racial supremacy of the
European over the Muslim were questioned,” such as it increasingly became after World War II. 53
In the United States, the meaning to domestic and international laws concerning detainees has been framed
to justify the aims of the Bush administration during the War on Terror. The administration, like the French in
Algeria, formulated policy, enacted laws and interpreted previous laws to fit a certain ideological mold, even when
sidestepping international laws.
In his “Military Order of November 13, 2001,” President Bush stated that “if not detected and prevented,”
terrorists could cause further deaths, placing “at risk the continuity of the operations of the United States
Government.” 54 To prevent this, he said that the U.S. needed “to identify terrorists and those who support them…”
In order to do this though, the President said that because of the situation, it was “not practicable” to hold to the
“principles of law and the rules of evidence” which criminal trials typically follow because of the “extraordinary
emergency” the U.S. had been placed under. 55 The President then listed off the types of individuals who fell under
that category. According to him, the President can determine at his discretion that “there is reason to believe that
such individual[s]” are or were terrorists. 56 However, there was a complication in the determining of such cases
since, as stated before, the “principles of law and the rules of evidence” did not apply. At the very highest level of
government, the President was stating that certain people did not qualify for the basic rights attributed to criminals
in the U.S., or to those given P.O.W. status. In such a light, the President took a step toward torture and prisoner
abuse.
White House Council Alberto Gonzales wrote a memo in January 2002 to the President in favor of his
decision not to apply the Geneva Conventions to Al Qaeda or the Taliban, and not to give POW status to detained
combatants. His main argument in favor of this was that “the war against terrorism is a new kind of war” that
“places a high premium” on “the ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and their sponsors in
order to avoid further atrocities.” He believed this new war “renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations… and
renders quaint some of its provisions.” 57 Gonzales further justified this by stating this kind of war was “not
contemplated in 1949 when the GPW was framed.” 58 However, the GPW had no type of particular armed conflict
in mind and that those High Contracting Parties, such as the United States were bound to follow the rules during any
type of armed conflict.
The French in Algeria argued that their war was a new kind of war as well. Like the United States of
today, compared to the enemy the French were fighting, they were vastly superior in technology and numbers.
Roger Trinquier, a major theorist on counter-insurgency warfare and a former French officer in Algeria wrote
Modern Warfare: A French View of Counter-Insurgency, published for the US military at the Combat Studies
Institute. Trinquier called the French Army “a pile driver attempting to crush a fly, indefatigably persisting in
repeating its efforts.” 59 This book, heavily influential in how the United States carries out its own insurgencies
shows that the use of terrorism to fight a war is not a novel idea, and therefore does not render irrelevant the Geneva
Conventions.
It was not that the United States was unaware of some of the negative consequences of using methods that
could be considered torture. It was simply the perceived importance of the mission at hand that trumpeted all other
concerns. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld formed a “working group,” designed to “assess the legal, policy,
and operational issues relating to the interrogations of detainees held by the U.S. Armed Forces.” 60 The group’s
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report stated that many of the techniques being used by the U.S. would be considered by some nations and people as
“more aggressive than those appropriate for POWs violative of international law… making U.S. personnel involved
in the use of such techniques subject to prosecution for perceived human rights violations.” The report accurately
predicted the negative consequences of some of the techniques to be used, saying that “should information regarding
the use of more aggressive interrogation techniques… become public, it… may produce an adverse effect on support
for the war on terrorism.” 61 With this in mind, framers of policy in the war on terrorism created an interpretation of
laws that fit the ideological framework of the United State’s democracy disseminating mission.
This ‘adverse effect’ took form during the French-Algerian War. Domestic protest against the way the
government was waging the war in Algeria eventually came to such a head, that the war effort became
compromised. The laws created and the methods employed by the French military and police in Algeria worked to
create this protest. The “121 Manifesto on the Right to Refuse to take up Arms in the Algerian War” was a
declaration signed by 121 intellectuals in France, including such influential people as Simon de Beauvoir, and JeanPaul Sartre. 62 In order to win “in the fight against public indifference and apathy” in regards to torture, certain
committees in France tried “to give suffering a recognizable human face.” 63 These committees also led by many
leading French intellectuals helped to stir the passions of the French public and their belief in the overall mission in
Algeria. Thus, the ideology of the civilizing mission as justification of the torture techniques in Algeria simply
worked to increase the public’s negative reaction to the war. The United States too, stands the risk of losing its
ideological justification which Bush says “leads us into the world to help the afflicted and defend the peace and
confound the designs of evil men.” Thus is the effect over-time of justifying abuses by fitting them into law
according to an ideology.

Ideologies Revealed in Government Reports
During the entirety of the French-Algerian War, the French government conducted one investigation into
reports of torture which amounted to about twelve pages of text. The United States has had several investigations
conducted under its own direction. Major General Antonio Taguba was directed to investigate the 800th Military
Police Brigade based on the photographs and reports of torture in Abu Ghraib prison. 64 James R. Schlesinger was
tasked to head an independent panel to review Department of Defense Detention operations in the fallout of Abu
Ghraib. 65 And Lieutenant General Anthony Jones and Major General George Fay investigated the Abu Ghraib
prison and detention facility under the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. 66 Combined, these U.S. government
investigations constitute a much more thorough analysis of abuses that occurred when compared to the French
government’s single investigation. However, analysis of the way both the French Government and the U.S.
Government investigated reports of torture reveals a belief in their respective missions of spreading similar
ideologies.
In 1955, French Minister of the Interior, François Mitterand, directed government servant Roger
Wuillaume to investigate the reports on torture and come up with recommendations. 67 Intentionally avoiding use of
the word “torture” throughout his report minus two instances, Wuillaume wrote about “certain acts of violence,”
reported in the media. The report was very brief and had the goal of treating reports of abuses as rare, and to
document it to show the French as being pro-active about it. Before detailing any abuses, he wrote that “several of
the prisoners stated that no violence has been used on them,” attempting to prove the rarity of abuses. Also,
Wuillaume justified some of the abuses as an “old-established practice,” and that “they were far less barbaric than
others… against which no one protests.” This was a defense by the French government of the methods being used
by the police and army in Algiers, arguing them as tried and true, very effective practices. When Wuillaume did

61

62
63
64

65

66

67

“Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal,
Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations,” in Torture and Truth, 196.
Evans, The Memory, ix-x.
Evans, The Memory, 143.
Anthony Taguba, “Article 15-6 Investigations of the 800th Military Police Brigade (The Taguba Report),” in
Torture and Truth, 279-328.
James R. Schlesinger, “Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Operations (The Schlesinger
Report),” in Torture and Truth, 329-402.
Anthony R. Jones, and George R. Fay, “Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib,” in Torture and
Truth, 403-579.
Maran, 24.

18

document cases of individuals with physical marks of abuse, instead of condemning the perpetrators, he stated that if
the law “were allowed to do no more than hunt down and arrest ‘suspected culprits’, and if it was the job of the
examining magistrates to establish their guilt, many crimes and misdemeanours would go unpunished.” According
to the man investigating the abuses, torture was necessary.
Wuillaume then described “the forms of violence used.” He described methods such as isolated
confinement, beatings and water immersion, “water-pipe method” where water is forced into the stomach through
the mouth, electricity to the genitals and other sensitive parts, prolonged bodily suspension, and being “forced to
dance naked in front of their relatives and neighbors, which for a Muslim is a fearful humiliation.” These clear
descriptions of torture are consistently taken by Wuillaume a degree of disbelief, illustrating his mistrust of the
prisoners and his overwhelming trust of the French interrogators.
He then described the “authority under which violence was used.” He began by stating that “it is extremely
difficult to fix the responsibility for the use of violence even in the most serious cases,” because most of the methods
“leave no marks.” Here, the role of the French ideology comes into play. A sense of mistrust toward the accusers of
torture, especially the detainees of Algerian descent was evident. At the same time, Wuillaume stated that the police
explained to him “they are expert at using these methods without endangering the victim’s life,” without questioning
the veracity of the claim. Then, in defense of the methods, he reminded his audience of “the atrocities committed by
the terrorists themselves,” who “massacred or mutilated large numbers” of those loyal to France, hinting that they
probably deserved to be tortured. Thus, Wuillaume illustrated the ideology of the French civilizing mission by
depicting French interrogators as noble servants of the cause while portraying Algerian accusers as deserving of the
abuse.
Wuillaume did state “all physical violence verging upon torture must be prohibited,” finally using the word
itself, but in a way that separated torture from what the police did. 68 He assumed a definition of torture to be
something more than just violence against a person, but excessive violence. However, measuring violence against
excessive violence is not done with a yard-stick, but in the eye of the interrogator. Wuillaume willingly left that up
to the professionals. They were French soldiers and policemen, and therefore, they could be trusted. They played
the part of parent over the Algerians by punishing them for their disloyalty to France, a nation simply trying to uplift
them.
According to Wuillaume, the overall mission in Algeria was too important, and he felt that any impediment
on the rights of the police and the army to do their job would seriously weaken their efficacy. He was of the mind
that in order to protect the many in Algeria, that crimes against the few were permissible, even if not legal. Thus,
Wuillaume considered the role of Algérie française so important, that his recommendation to the government only
served to continually justify torture because it was in the name of the ideology of the Mission civilisatrice. The fact
that the report was written in 1955, well before the bulk of the torture abuses happened in Algeria, illustrate further
how unconcerned the French government and army really were towards basic ideas of human rights for the
Algerians.
The investigations the U.S. government mandated in 2003-2004 are much more thorough than the French
report. The war in Iraq was extremely unpopular. This was exacerbated with the advent of super-fast forms of
communication, making reports of torture more problematic than it had been for the French government during their
war in Algeria. It was something that could not ever be disregarded for a long period of time as it was in Algeria.
The reports concerning the Abu Ghraib torture scandal made recommendations to punish those soldiers responsible
for or complicit in the abuse. Also, the reports urged for a review of military doctrine and training in regards to the
handling of detainees. However, the government reports placed blame downward and never higher up the chain of
command past the brigade level. 69 Even when those implemented in abuse “commented upon the intense pressure
they felt from higher headquarters, to include CENTCOM [United States Central Command], the Pentagon, and the
DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] for timelier, actionable intelligence,” they were the ones blamed for allowing
their soldiers “to be subjected to inordinate pressure from Higher Headquarters.” 70 Thus, what was said at higher
levels did not matter, and that those in charge of operations at Abu Ghraib, such as Colonel Pappas, commander of
the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, should have known that.
Deciphering the role of American ideology in the government reports is a difficult task because of the care
put into compiling them and the fact-finding nature of them. In contrast to the lone French government report which
expresses a high degree of French superiority over the Muslim Algerians, the U.S. reports illustrate a desire to truly
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fix the problem by punishing those responsible for torture techniques and by implementing military-wide changes in
doctrine and training. However, the role of the American ideology in the War on Terror is expressed by the sense of
infallibility of those high up the chain of command. The reports inevitably hint that the leaders of the War on Terror
cannot have been responsible for misdeeds. Even if there was a desire to fairly assess the faults of the Bush
Administration's direct and indirect orders that led to human rights abuses, there’s still an idea that “war is hell,” and
nothing ever goes right all of the time.

Ideology of the Soldiers
Ideology among soldiers in both the French Army in Algeria and the United States military in Afghanistan
and Iraq were both shaped by the similar values of their nations. The French soldiers had a “shared understanding of
the duty to maintain and spread French civilization.” 71 However, different ideas as to how this duty was fulfilled led
to “confusion about the correct way to carry out their duty.” Under this ideology of the civilizing mission as the allimportant reason for being in Algeria, the army “supplied a workable rationale that obviated conscious decisionmaking” regarding the moral dilemma of committing torture. 72 The United States military also ‘supplied a workable
rationale that obviated conscious decision-making.’ Calling the war in Iraq a “crucial advance in the campaign
against terror,” President Bush framed the fight there as good versus evil, free peoples versus terrorists in his speech
aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln. 73 Therefore, the seed had been planted, labeling those in Iraq against the US
mission a ‘terrorist.’ Soldiers stood “for freedom and order,” against the “terrorists and Saddam loyalists.” 74 The
impact on the conscience of individual soldiers fighting in the War on Terror was lessened when they considered
their enemy responsible for the attacks on September 11th. Just as with the French in Algeria, Americans in Iraq
were imbued with an ideology that took away humanitarian concerns while supposedly promoting a humanitarian
cause.
Part of the reason for French soldiers’ determination in supporting their ideology in Algeria has much to do
with their recent history stemming the previous two decades. The French military was feeling the physical and
emotional strain of perpetual defeat stemming from the Nazi occupation in 1940 to the loss of the Indo-China War in
1954 and subsequent colonial wars elsewhere. The French military sought victory as a means to regain honor, even
at an extremely high cost. That is one huge difference between the root causes of torture implementation between
the two conflicts. The French military, seeing itself betrayed by the politics of the Fourth Republic had a different
rationale of its mission in Algeria: “We have not come here… to defend colonialism. We have nothing in common
with the rich colons who exploit the Muslims. We are the defenders of liberty and of a new order.” When speaking
about the institutions of the Fourth Republic, the military ran radio station in Algeria announced that in Indo-China,
those “men liberally betrayed us…” and that in Algeria, “here you will not be betrayed.” 75 To the generals and
career soldiers, “Algeria was the test of their redemption as soldiers and as Frenchmen imbued with a mission to
save the nation from a democratic system perceived as corrupt, dysfunctional, and lacking the will to fight.” 76 The
soldiers on the other hand, were going to do whatever it was going to take to save French –and their own –honor.
The United States military has recent memories of success in the Cold War standoff and campaigns such as
Operation Desert Storm in 1991, as well as a mixture of failures in Vietnam and the involvement in Somalia in the
early 1990’s. Dissent among high-ranking generals in recent years regarding handling of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan has only occurred after they have retired or under anonymity, illustrating that while maybe in
disagreement with policies of the government, there is a sense of allegiance toward the civilian authorities while still
in uniform that continues to remain strong. 77 This differs from the commanders in Algeria who openly disobeyed or
fought against their own government. While there is this difference in recent histories between the French military
and United States military, there is still a sense that the U.S. cannot be allowed to lose in its wars either.
The use of terrorism by the FLN and Al Qaeda was enough to cause both France and the United States to
use torture methods to suppress the organizations, adhering to an idea that “massive violence,” such as systematic
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torture “has usually prevailed over terrorism, because there is not an unlimited reservoir of people” who will
continue to attack these nations. 78 The ultimate goal in the Battle of Algiers was to destroy the FLN network by any
means necessary. General Jacques Massu, the hero of the day during the famous Battle of Algiers, claimed that the
use of torture was extremely justified, that “the battle was won and a halt was brought to the F.L.N. –imposed terror
and the indiscriminate killing and maiming of both European and Muslim civilians.” 79 However, General Massu at
the time, failed to take into account the “emotional weapon” that the tortured populace gained. Albert Camus stated
that “torture has perhaps saved some at the expense of honour, by uncovering thirty bombs, but at the same time it
has created fifty new terrorists who… would cause the death of even more innocent people.” 80 Also, the defeat of
the F.L.N. in Algiers forced the leaders of the revolution to seek safety in Tunisia, where it would organize a
government in exile, and most importantly, the internationalization of the war via television. 81 The use of torture in
Abu Ghraib no doubt did much to anger millions of moderate Muslims throughout the Middle East, surely bringing
into the ranks of the Iraqi insurgency many reinforcements.
There are varying rationales among regular soldiers in regards to torture. Since no two soldiers are the
same, their perceptions of how an ideology should be spread vary as well. One American soldier who spoke out
about abuses at Abu Ghraib in 2003 expressed frustration at others for allowing torture to happen: “Every time I
said something about how I was worried about the treatment of the detainees, they would either say, thy [sic] are the
enemy and if I was out there they would kill me, so they didn’t care.” 82 This soldier, Sergeant Provance was among
many who saw the twisting of the American ideology of fighting for freedom by suppressing some very basic
freedoms through the practice of torture.
The same rationale was used among French soldiers in Algeria, including the willingness to kill prisoners,
not just torture. A veteran soldier talked to his new captain who thought it was “a bad practice to kill possible
innocents.” In regards to Arabs in general possibly being terrorists, the veteran soldier said to his captain “…once
you’re here, to pose yourself problems of conscience – and treat possible assassins as presumed innocents – that’s a
luxury that costs dear, and costs men.” 83 In essence, the veteran asked the inexperienced captain: What is more
important? Everything you value, including the safety of France and its mission, or the possible innocence of a few?
With this view in mind, the willingness and the self-justification to use torture – and more extreme measures –
against prisoners came more easily.
Soldiers fighting for France thought of Algeria as the last of the old French Empire that covered much of
Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The focus of the mission was to keep Algeria as an integral part of
France. Thus, they were often inclined to behave in a manner that coincided with the brutality of colonialism. The
United States in Iraq has often been compared to an imperialist venture. One letter to the editor of the New York
Times in response to the White House reaction to the abuses at Abu Ghraib states “these soldiers realize they were
sent on an imperialistic mission and behave accordingly, reflecting the nature of the administration that sent
them!” 84 Whether soldiers or the administration believed the mission to be imperialistic, there have continued to be
American soldiers willing to use methods regarded as torture, even after Abu Ghraib. A survey conducted by the
Army in Iraq in the fall of 2006 found that up to 40 percent of soldiers would approve of torture techniques in order
to save the lives of other soldiers. 85 Extenuating circumstances such as saving the lives of other soldiers can make
rationale for abuse more understandable, but of the troops surveyed, 10 percent of them “reported that they had
mistreated civilians in Iraq, such as kicking them or needlessly damaging their possessions.” 86 General Patreaus, in
a letter to all military personnel in Iraq, stated that he “was concerned by the results” of the report and reminded
them how respect for human dignity separated America from the enemy. 87
With the knowledge that no two soldiers are exactly alike in ideology or how to express that ideology, it is
unjustified to place blame on the group as a whole. With all the soldiers of both the French-Algerian War and the
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U.S. wars after September 11th, ideology has also been expressed by the condemnation of torture and abuse, not just
its approval. Paul Teitgan, past wartime resistance fighter and victim of Nazi torture, was secretary-general of the
Prefecture of Algiers supervising the police from 1956-1958. He resigned his post, citing “the excesses and the
torture were the reasons.” 88 His view of French ideology, of the civilizing mission, was against the use of torture
and “once [you] get into the torture business, you’re lost… fear was the basis of it all. All our so-called civilisation
is covered with a varnish. Scratch it, and underneath you find fear.” 89
On the other end of the spectrum, some soldiers under the cover of legal and perceived moral sanction saw
torture in a different light. General Paul Aussaresses, director of intelligence operations during the Battle of Algiers
wrote a memoir of his experience in Algeria entitled The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in
Algeria, 1955-1957. In the preface of his book, Aussaresses states:
What I did in Algeria was undertaken for my country in good faith, even though I didn’t enjoy it.
One must never regret anything accomplished in the line of a duty one believes in… I don’t
attempt to justify my actions, but only to explain that once a country demands that its army fight
an enemy who is using terror to compel an indifferent population to join its ranks and provoke a
repression that will in turn outrage international public opinion, it becomes impossible for that
army to avoid using extreme measures. 90
Aussaresses had his mind set that in the Algerian War, torture was the only way to win. He not only thought it was
the way to win, but the moral thing as well. After all, he said what he did was done ‘in good faith.’
The dark side to the pro-torture argument among the soldiers was that even if done ‘in good faith’ it still
worked to betray the ideological missions of both France and the United States. It is hard to justify torture when the
people doing it say to their prisoners:
‘You’re going to talk! Everybody talks here! We fought the war in Indo-China –that was enough
to know your type. This is the Gestapo Here! You know the Gestapo?... And your whore of a
Republic, we will blow it up into the air, too! You’re going to talk, I tell you.’ 91
This example, from Alleg’s account of being tortured by members of the 10th Paras division, illustrates very
strongly how torture was betraying the spirit of the Republic and the Rights of Man, the cornerstone of French
ideology.
The soldiers carrying out their duties in both France’s war and the U.S.’s war have been the ones most
affected by policies which govern prisoner treatment and torture application, besides the victims themselves. Also,
they are the ones that are most directly representative of their home countries when in a war of occupation
elsewhere. Thus, similar ideologies which purport to spread democratic civil values to ‘uncivilized’ parts of the
world are largely the responsibility of the individual soldiers, French and American. The trickling down of
inhumane policies such as ambiguous laws which make abuse easier tend to create confusion among those doing the
actual work of carrying out the wars of their nations. That confusion has led to differing ideas in the ranks as to the
proper method of treating the enemy, and to shield the conscience of many from doing what would normally be
considered morally unacceptable.

Ideology and Public Remembrance
It was the same ideology, the idea that France was a special nation, dedicated to certain democratic values
that also drove the anti-war and anti-torture movement at home. The ideology played a reverse role in the public by
proving the hypocrisy in the French colonial mission because of the violent torture. Public opinion against torture
became the most effective weapon that led to the decolonization and independence of Algeria. However, for a war
that was very much in the public mind at the time, it was very easily “forgotten” by the public at large after it ended.
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It was simply a war that people wanted to forget, but not everyone could, especially the victims and perpetrators of
torture.
What role did ideology play in the public’s remembrance –or lack of remembrance –of the Algerian War?
The desire for French greatness, to continue spreading ideas from the Mission civilisatrice without doing so by the
familiar formula of colonial occupation had much to do with this. France moved on and left behind its old ways, in
favor of focusing on prestige in other manners. "Charles de Gaulle could now turn to his goal of making France the
leader of Europe." 92 In 1960, France became the fourth nuclear power in the world. It then became an important
player in the development of the European Community, now the European Union. 93 The leadership provided by de
Gaulle in the post-Algerian War period allowed France to focus on the development of the European and French
economies. 94
The use of torture in the Algerian War helped contribute to the sour legacy of the war that the French were
to endure. Unlike memories of French victory in World War I and the Resistance in World War II, the Algerian
War was not seen by many Frenchmen as a moment to be proud of. It was representative of the last bastion of the
lost French Empire, of a waste of lives for no real reason, and of French violations of human rights on a mass scale.
All that, after all the horrors of World War II, of the new ideals of a “new Europe,” bound by the international laws
of the Geneva Conventions, where humans were assumed to have universal rights accorded them –there had still
been that kind of war fought in the name of France.
As a result of the shame the war had brought to France, there was reluctance to even call it a war. Instead,
the government called a “police action,” a much less violent euphemism. Plus, there was the idea that since Algeria
was officially as much a part of France as Paris was at the time, there was the rationale that if it was called a war it
would mean that France acknowledged Algeria as a separate nation at the time of the conflict. 95 Only in 1999 did
the conflict get official recognition by the government as an actual “war” in the Law of 18 October 1999. 96 This
recognition coincided with a growing awareness of the victims of torture, psychological illnesses in soldiers, and the
true gravity of the war that was meant to be largely forgotten but was too powerful to ignore.
In a backlash to the negativity surrounding the French-Algerian War, there has been a recent attempt to
promote the ideology of the Mission civilisatrice by trying to rewrite history in order to change public remembrance
of torture in Algeria. On February 23, 2005, a law was introduced in the French parliament which stated that
“teachers should teach the ‘positive role’ of the French presence overseas, especially in North Africa.” 97 This
attempt to promote French ideologies through an interpretation of the past drew protests from Algerians, historians,
and others concerned about the state’s role in prescribing how history ought to be taught. This protest, and
implications about France’s relations with Algeria, led to an executive decree nullifying the law. 98 However,
cancellation of the law “does not diminish the importance of the episode… in showing the contested memories and
histories of French expansion.” 99 This attempt to rewrite history, in doing so rewriting the role of torture used by
the French in Algeria, proved unsuccessful. In reality, it served more to bring to light many of the negative aspects
of French colonialism, especially torture in Algeria.
It may be too early to tell how the United States will be remembered for its conduct in the “War on Terror”
and its use of torture. However, the images of American soldiers giving a thumbs up in front of a human pyramid of
naked prisoners or in front of the corpse of a dead prisoner, or the image of a hooded prisoner standing on a box for
fear of falling off which would mean certain electrocution, and images of police dogs barking at naked prisoners are
seared into the minds of people all around the world. Whether Americans should use torture is still a subject of
debate among politicians, intellectuals, and the public at large. 100 It is important however, to assess how American
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ideology might judge the use of torture by the US. Like the French, many Americans were appalled at what
representatives of their country did at places such as at Abu Ghraib. How torture affects the collective memory of
this war will determine the judgment of history.

Conclusion
Torture, committed under an ideological banner by representatives of the United States and under the
pressure of the highest levels of government cannot be easily explained. It is abstract to think in terms of a mission
to spread democracy, western values and beliefs. However, this attempt to explain it through the similar history of
the French experience in Algeria sheds light on the situation the United States is in today. France’s Mission
civilisatrice, deeply rooted in concepts of the French Revolution and the ideas set fourth in the Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen, was ideally a humanitarian venture to help those in other parts of the world in
need. It became in reality a tradition of conquering other countries and subjugating their people to forced colonial
rule in order to obtain resources, to retain the status as a great nation, and to spread Christianity. The United States
shares a similar ideology, also rooted in its revolution. The creation of the first modern democracy imbued
Americans with a sense of virtue and greatness, if not a sometimes jingoistic pride. The events of September 11th,
2001 allowed for that ideology to justify recent military intervention and for the twisting of ideology to be a
justification for torture.
The creation and selective interpretation of laws allow democracies to create policies that promote abuse of
prisoners. The French Special Powers act, in defense of the perceived importance of the overall mission of Algérie
française, allowed for expansive police and military powers to do what was deemed necessary to win the war. This
more easily allowed for interment, torture, and displacement of individuals deemed a threat to Algérie française.
Once the War on Terror began, members of the highest levels of government began interpreting international and
national laws in ways which allowed for how they thought detainees should be handled. They were able to skirt
those norms by hiding behind an ideological banner of spreading democracy and defeating evil ideas and people.
It was both the French and US government’s creation and interpretation of laws which denied basic human rights to
prisoners, in turn creating international and domestic outrage and a loss of support for the mission.
Ideology revealed in government investigations is revealed differently among the French and U.S.
investigators. Perhaps changing standards are the reason for the difference. The singular French investigation, the
Wuillaume Report was heavily biased in reporting of abuses. While admitting abuses were going on, the report
displays a high confidence in the interrogators and the French mission in general, while at the same time showing a
mistrust toward the Algerians who were tortured with the attitude that ‘they probably deserved it.’ The United
States on the other hand has had numerous in-detail investigations concerning torture, especially at Abu-Ghraib
Prison. They represented a true effort to determine what went wrong, why abuses happened, and how to implement
those lessons in future doctrine so such a thing does not undermine later missions. However, the unwillingness of
any of the government investigators to look further up the chain of command illustrates the idea that the mission is
all important. The ones leading the War on Terror, in their eyes, are righteous in their cause and so is the United
States.
The soldiers on the ground in both the French and U.S. wars were most affected by their nation's ideology.
Because of perceived missions to spread certain western values, these soldiers deployed in far-off locations to carry
out the orders of their superiors to preserve an idea. Sometimes, soldiers were blinded by that imbued ideology
when it came to torturing prisoners. Some, on the other hand, saw that ideology as the reason not to torture and to
report abuses. Some soldiers saw torture as essential to winning the war while others saw it as an essential reason
for losing the war. The position these soldiers were placed in, both the French and US, and the constant reminder of
their role in these great humanitarian missions which blinded the conscious of many soldiers who committed torture.
Public memory of the French-Algerian War has done much to disregard the importance of that war. The
negativity surrounding it has led to issues such as torture victims and soldiers being essentially forgotten about
because of the desire to do just that: Forget. What the public in the United States years from now will collectively
remember depends greatly on its treatment of the enemy, especially in regards to torture.
Ideological constructs such as the Mission civilisatrice of France or the Wilsonian model of military
intervention to promote democracy of the United States have too often served to justify activities that deny those
ideologies. Torture by the French in Algeria illustrates the value of looking toward history to help determine what
might happen in the future. The United States in the War on Terror has used the ideology of freedom, democracy,
and liberty to attack those deemed to hate those concepts. However, dehumanization of the enemy and a perceived
supremacy of the mission under that ideology led to torture. It is in the best interest of the United States to develop
policies that not only promote democracy, but also rationalism and restraint. One of the best places to look to do
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just that, and to check the power of its own ideologies is a study of the French and its use of torture during the
French-Algerian War.
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